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Over the Hill 





If there is an article of faith among gerontologists, it is 
that chronological age is irrelevant. Over and over again, we 
are told that some persons are ready for retirement in their 
30s and 40s, while others are responsible for great 
philosophical or scientific achievements well into their eighth 
and ninth decade of life.
Examples of age and creativity are cited in the column by 
Cyril F. Brickfield, executive director of the Association of 
Retired Persons. 1 Jessica Tandy at age 74 opened trium 
phantly on Broadway in the demanding role of Amanda 
Winfield in the revival of Tennessee Williams' "Glass 
Menagerie." Her performance was widely acclaimed by the 
drama critics. Just down the street, Rex Harrison, at age 75, 
opened successfully in the revival of "Heartbreak House" 
by George Bernard Shaw, who continued to write plays until 
late in life.
The same evidence is clear from last year's Nobel Prize 
awards. At age 81 Barbara McClintock won the Nobel for 
medicine while Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar, 73, and 
William Fowler, 72, shared the prize for physics.
Other examples abound. Benjamin Franklin invented 
bifocals at age 78; Giovanni Colle at age 70 provided the first
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definitive description of blood transfusion and Benjamin 
Duggar discovered a life-saving antibiotic at age 76. 
Brickfield concludes that creativity can occur at any age, 
even at advanced ages, and creativity in old age is not found 
only among the rare individuals who are famous.
The absurdity of the compulsory retirement age is 
dramatized neatly in a letter from Bernard L. Baer in the 
New York Times, February 19, 1984. At age 73 Baer volun 
tarily retired and after a year of frustrating idleness began to 
look for jobs. He maintains he was 100 percent able mentally 
and physically but was consistently and regretfully turned 
down because of age. His background was in sales promo 
tion, advertising and management. In desperation, he revis 
ed he vita, simply lying by taking 11 years off his age. Within 
two months he had a job.
Seven years later, even though he claimed he received 
merit increases and additional responsibilities every year, he 
was mandatorily retired at age 70. He was actually 81 at the 
time and as able physically and mentally as when he retired, 
according to his own version of events. This is one illustra 
tion of how ridiculous mandatory retirement can be. He 
notes, as many others have, "some people become incapable 
in their 70s, 50s, 40s and 30s; many retain the capability 
beyond their 70s. They should be appraised accordingly and 
not automatically dispensed with."
I do not challenge this precept. Personal observation con 
firms that some people of rather tender age would be happier 
retired or at least not working in their current occupations. 
But I cite one fundamental advantage of chronological 
age—that is its definitiveness. All one needs to prove age is a 
birth certificate, but once we discard the criterion of a 
chronological age, we must seek substitutes. If there are dif 
ferences among people in terms of ability and performance 
on the job, how does one begin to think about measuring
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them? Once we forget the number of years one has spent in 
this world, we must move on to less definite criteria to judge 
ability to do the job at hand.
As it turns out, this is the mirror image of the problem that 
those of us who have been interested in the economics of 
disability have been struggling with for years. To distinguish 
among those persons in the population who should be 
classified as disabled and those who should not, to determine 
who is qualified to receive a transfer payment because of a 
disabling condition and who is not, is a very old problem. In 
the disability case, the quest is for a measure of physical and 
mental functional limitations; in the retirement case, it is a 
search for measures of performance which probably depend 
on residual functional capacities.
In this paper we examine the disability experience to show 
how difficult the problem of determining disability status 
has been. Nothing in the disability experience provides any 
aid or comfort to those who allege that we should eliminate 
compulsory retirement and judge persons by their ability to 
do the job.
We first look briefly at the improvements in longevity 
which are the reasons for the problem receiving so much re 
cent attention. Scholars disagree as to whether the declines in 
mortality are associated with improvements or declines in 
health status. We discuss that controversy and conclude that 
if our interest is in work ability, then it is something more 
than health that we must be concerned with. It is not even 
"active life expectancy," but the decision to participate or 
not participate in the labor force.
We examine the disability record from ancient days to pre 
sent to show how difficult disability determination decisions 
have been. Even where sophisticated models seek to include 
all relevant variables, it is the health measures which prove to 
be most elusive. Examination of that experience leads us to
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advice caution in eliminating employers' freedom to retire 
persons after a certain age.
Improvement in Longevity
What seems to be undisputed is the improvement in mor 
tality rates in this century. 2 The greatest relative improve 
ment has occurred at the young ages, resulting largely from 
the control of infectious diseases. The probability of death at 
age 0 decreased 90 percent between 1900 and 1980, but look 
what has happened to those who survived to age 65. At age 
65 the probability of death decreased 30 percent from 1900 
to 1980 for males and 61 percent for females, a gap I expect 
to see narrowed as women become increasingly subject to the 
same pressures and hazards as men. In the meantime, those 
males lucky enough to survive can look forward to this un 
balanced relationship among the sexes.
We are dealing with a relatively new phenomenon. Life ex 
pectancy at age 65 increased very little from 1900 to 1930, 
but since that time there have been rapid gains in life expec 
tancy at age 65 that have occurred for both males and 
females, though again the females having the greater gains.
Incidentally, in spite of these improvements in mortality 
rates, we should expect a decline in the net annual increase in 
the number of social security beneficiaries at the turn of the 
century. The low fertility rates during the 1930s will be 
reflected in a considerable reduction in the rate of increase in 
the population over 65 during the 1990s in spite of any im 
provements in the mortality rate. This will come about just 
at the time when the baby boom generation born after World 
War II will be swelling the labor force.
After 2015, the growth in the labor force is expected to 
slow down reflecting the decline of fertility rates which 
began in the mid 60s. It is then that we expect social security
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financing problems, which can be alleviated if workers retire 
later.
Improvements or Declines in Health
There come now the controversial issues. Alicia Munnell 
forecasts that tomorrow's elderly will have improved life ex 
pectancy, better health, and more education than those retir 
ing today. 3 On two of these accounts, there can be no 
faulting Ms. Munnell—improved life expectancy and more 
education. The question of better health is one that is in 
question.
In sharp contrast to Munnell's position is that taken by 
James H. Schulz who believes that increased longevity does 
not necessarily mean more surviving older persons will be 
able to work. He emphasizes the many health factors that 
operate to reduce mortaility may also reduce the 
employability of older persons. Examples include: improved 
survival from myocardial infarctions among the disabled; 
the persistence of the incidence of arthritis or any of a 
number other disabling conditions that do not generally 
cause death; successful treatment of individuals with prob 
lems such as diabetes that previously would cause early 
deaths but that are still disabling, and alcohol or drug 
abuse. 4
This discrepancy in the viewpoints of these two eminent 
scholars has been pointed out by Michael Taussig in his 
discussion of the two papers and it is Taussig who notes that 
pension policy decisions depend critically on who is right.
"We expect that continued improvements in 
medical care and technology will—in the absence of 
nuclear war or some other catastrophe of com 
parable magnitude—cause a large increase in the 
number of persons who survive until, and well past,
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the traditional retirement ages in this country. We 
do not yet know, however, whether the expected in 
crease in longevity will cause a corresponding in 
crease in the number of dependent aged persons. If 
the aged workers of tomorrow is healthier than 
either his or her counterpart today, and if there are 
sufficient attractive job opportunities, then increas 
ed longevity will not necessarily mean increased 
dependency." 5
The same controversy runs through the early reports of the 
National Commission on Social Security, as Jacob J. 
Feldman has pointed out. In the March 1981 report, the ma 
jority position was that increased longevity will be accom 
panied by a corresponding increase in active life. Also, that 
periods of diminished vigor associated with aging will 
decrease so that the chronic disease will occupy a smaller 
proportion of the typical life span. Yet a minority of the 
Commission contended that the evidence does not support 
any claim that longer life is equivalent to longer years of 
good health. Feldman notes that the current state of 
knowledge does not permit a definitive resolution of that 
controversy. 6
Noting the dramatic decline in death rates, Feldman asks 
whether that decline among persons 50 to 69 years of age is 
tantamount to improved health and working capacity. He 
notes first of all some short term trends. Using data from the 
National Health Interview Survey, he notes that 21.9 percent 
of men aged 65 to 69 answered that they had activity limita 
tions that prevented them from working in 1970 a percentage 
that increased to 24.9 in 1975 and 25.2 in 1980.
Even greater differences are to be found among the other 
age groups in the 50 to 54, 55 to 58 and 60 to 64 ages. This in 
crease took place during a period of rapid decline in death 
rates for men in these age groups. Some suggestive data
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Feldman cites indicate that if we go back further, the 
disability or activities limitation rate for men age 55 to 64 
was about 10 percent in 1949 and even lower in 1935.
As Feldman notes, morbidity is difficult to quantify as op 
posed to the relative ease of measuring mortality. Social 
security actuaries rationalize their ignoring morbidity rates 
on the grounds that mortality and morbidity are correlated; 
when mortality improves, morbidity also tends to improve. 7 
Feldman disagrees. He believes that a decline in mortality 
rates can be connected with an increase in morbidity rates. 
Life-threatening conditions are not the same as disabling 
conditions. While there is obviously some overlap, a great 
deal of disability is caused by conditions that are not lethal. 
Musculoskeletal conditions are the cause of a large propor 
tion of work disability. Arthritis, for instance, does not ap 
pear to shorten one's life span to any great extent. In his 
view, there is no reason why reductions in mortality rates 
should result in a reduction in the prevalence of arthritis or 
any of a number of other disabling conditions that are 
generally not lethal.
Active Life Expectancy
Since there is sharp disagreement about whether mortality 
and morbidity are closely correlated, it is necessary to have 
something other than improvements in mortality rates if we 
are to have confidence in estimates of the future labor supply 
of older workers. The problem has been addressed by a 
Massachusetts research team headed by Dr. Sidney Katz who 
developed a concept of "active life expectancy." They use 
life tables techniques to analyze the expected remaining years 
of functional well-being for their sample of noninstitu- 
tionalized elderly people living in Massachusetts in 1974. 
Waves of these people were interviewed at periodic intervals. 
They found that the expected years of active life expectancy 
range from 10 years for those 65 to 70 years to 2.9 years for
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those 85 years or older. Active life expectancy is shorter for 
the poor than others and women had a longer average dura 
tion of expected dependency than men. 8
It is a clever idea to construct life tables, not in terms of 
expected date of death, but expected date of incapacity; the 
contrast is between active versus inactive life. But the dif 
ficulty is that the contrast is too sharp, the division too 
abrupt. Scales of activities of daily living measure too much. 
The scales measure six basic functions; bathing, dressing, go 
ing to the bathroom, transfer, continence and eating. These 
are essential biological functions.
If, however, interest is in whether people are ready to go to 
work or not go to work, then it is obvious that some persons 
who may score quite high on these activities of daily living 
scales are still not necessarily able to jump into the labor 
market. Measuring limitations of persons based on essential 
biological functions is to move just one step from the mor 
tality scales themselves.
Health, Labor Supply and Survey
One of the problems noted by Newquist and Robinson9 is 
that health data, especially for the older population, has 
been gathered for purposes other than employment policy 
analysis. The problem is that the investigators discuss the 
problem in terms of morbidity factors, or in terms of ac 
tivities of daily living and these are clearly inappropriate. 
What is necessary is to get some concept of health which is 
applicable to the work decision and, at the same time, to 
recognize that health is only one of the factors that will af 
fect whether older persons are going to be active participants 
in the job market. In short, what we are dealing with here is a 
complex labor supply issue, complicated by this notion of 
what constitutes health and what does not constitute health 
and how one can measure it.
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This is a relatively old problem. It arises in theoretical and 
empirical models of labor supply as researchers attempt to 
include a health variable. The problem is present in surveys 
which attempt to examine the number and characteristics of 
disabled persons in the population. It has been a leading 
problem for years in all of the programs designed to compen 
sate persons who have disabling conditions. These include 
tort cases where juries set indemnity payments according to 
disability status, workers' compensation programs, and of 
course, the Social Security Disability Insurance program.
The Ancient Origins of the Problem
The notion of compensation for injuries can be traced 
back to the code of Hammurabi (1945-1902 B.C.). The 
essential advance in Hammurabi's code was the partial 
substitution of "compensation" to replace "retaliation." 10
One clear illustration of how compensation replaced 
retaliation is found in Exodus, Chapter 21, verses 18 and 19:
18. And if men contend, and one smite the other 
with a stone, or with his fists, and he die not, but 
keep his bed;
19. If he rise again and walk abroad upon his staff, 
then shall he that smote him be quit; only he shall 
pay for the loss of his time and shall cause him to 
be thoroughly healed.
The commentaries explain that compensation is awarded 
on five grounds for damage, for pain, for healing, for loss of 
time and for insult. (Insult apparently refers to payments 
made when the harm was intentionally inflicted.) Liability 
for healing extended to payment of medical costs. The com 
mentaries are quite specific as to when liability ceases and 
under what conditions the case may be reopened, to use the 
modern phrase.
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The commentaries speak of payment for damages in what 
appears to be strikingly modern terms. The idea was to look 
at the injured person, to appraise his worth before the in 
jury, and to contrast it with what he would be worth with the 
impairment. In a perfect market, the difference would be the 
present value of the future net product of the whole person 
as contrasted with the impaired one. Of course, in those 
days, there were examples at hand with slave markets, and 
these capitalized values could be observed. They did not have 
to be estimated by probabilistic functions dependent on im 
perfect knowledge of future earnings streams.
The ancient examples permit us to look at several facets of 
disability. In ancient codes and in modern day workers' com 
pensation, disability is often equated with a loss of limb, loss 
of an eye, or loss of hearing. Such losses are, of course, per 
manent. For purposes of both labor market analysis and 
disability analysis, it is permanent, chronic or long term, not 
short term, phenomena or acute illness, that is relevant. The 
permanent aspects are rather gruesomely exemplified by am 
putation, which is not only long term but quite permanent.
Another dimension that has to be focused on is the con 
cept of partial versus total disability and it is obvious, even in 
ancient days, that a man could sustain rather extensive 
physical damage and still participate to some extent in work. 
Thus a persons is not either disabled or not disabled, but 
there are various degrees of disability. The extent of disabili 
ty becomes particularly important when trying to assess the 
labor force chances of older persons.
Workers' Compensation Experience
Soon after workers' compensation was itnroduced in this 
country, beginning in 1911, the state laws provided for 
schedules derived from experience with private insurance 
carriers and from some of the European laws. Schedules
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soon became hallmarks of compensation statutes. Essential 
ly, these provided for a price, possibly the number of weeks 
of compensation that was to be paid, for specified losses. 
They detailed the prices of parts of the body. If a person lost 
a finger, toe, or wrist and arm, the amounts of compensation 
due him would be listed in the schedule, thereby minimizing 
administrative discretion.
Eminent legal scholars argue about the nature of the 
system. Larson believes it was a matter of operationalizing a 
wage-loss system appropriate to large scale mass social in 
surance programs." In effect, the schedules provided a way 
to proxy the wage loss suffered by some average person with 
these particular losses. Whatever the intellectual and 
theoretical justification, the schedules never lived up to their 
promise. The trouble was that persons simply did not always 
lose limbs at the particular joints specified in the schedule. 
More important, if the law that is going to compensate a per 
son for loss of an arm triggers a particular amount of com 
pensation, why not pay an equal amount for the loss of use 
of that arm? But once you consider loss of use and injuries to 
parts of the body not specified on the schedule, such as the 
back or head, you are into an area where discretion has to be 
used, thus defeating the purpose of the schedules.
The point to be made is that there are difficulties involved 
in assessing the amount of disability payments due a person 
with a particular type of work injury. The problem has been 
recognized for years and years under our workers' compen 
sation statutes.
In workers' compensation, the worker alleges either that 
he cannot now work at all, or that he cannot now work at the 
level of energy or capacity that he could prior to his injury, 
or that his injury has left him in a condition that will in 
terfere with his future ability to perform tasks in the same 
manner and method as he could have, had he not incurred
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that injury. The workers' compensation commissions 
therefore have the task of deciding whether there has been 
any such interference with the work potentiality of the in 
dividual and if so, how that deficiency can be measured. As 
noted above this is the mirror image of the problem faced by 
the aged. In the retirement case, it is the worker who alleges 
that his ability to work at his task, in the same degree of effi 
ciency and manner as before, has not been impaired. The 
employer who advocates retirement of the worker, alleges 
otherwise. Consequently, the question arises as to the ap 
propriate tests of limitation or residual capacity.
In workers' compensation where the schedules are not ap 
propriate (the vast majority of cases in most states), the com 
missions have developed several different theories to deter 
mine payment.
In some jurisdictions, payments will be made if the worker 
can demonstrate specific physical or mental impairment. 
Other states will not pay unless the worker can demonstrate 
actual wage loss. Jurisdictions in between, as it were, at 
tempt to evaluate a worker's loss of wage-earning capacity.
In any event, each of these methods has its distinct limita 
tions. Physical impairment is difficult to measure and more 
difficult to translate into compensation payments. It is one 
thing to be able to evaluate physical losses and another to be 
able to price these losses in some way that is meaningful in 
the labor market.
When it comes to wage loss, a method that is now being 
widely touted because of its recent adoption in the State of 
Florida, there are obvious difficulties. Michigan, for many 
years, had a wage-loss system in workers' compensation, but 
unfortunately, the complexities of the system, the institu 
tional arrangements, or other factors resulted in most cases 
ending up in compromise and release settlements. 12 So, 
although Michigan technically had a wage-loss system, it was
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to all intents and purposes really a bargaining system based 
on a workers' physical condition.
Michigan also had a problem which was unique among the 
states. Many workers who retired from automobile plants 
simultaneously filed workers' compensation claims. The so- 
called retirement problem exposed, in raw relief, the essen 
tial issue with which we are concerned. To what extent are 
workers who formally retired realistically in the labor 
market? Interestingly enough, in the Michigan cases, the 
claim was that the retirement status did not bar access to the 
labor market, rather it was alleged that some physical condi 
tion incurred during working life prevented working at the 
wages that otherwise would have been earned. The terrible 
complexities of that situation again argue for a certain ar 
bitrariness in defining an age of retirement, no matter how 
inequitable this may be to particular individuals.
It seems to be quite clear that no workers' compensation 
program had the lock on a perfect solution to its problems. 
All that can be said is that some states that actively interven 
ed in the administration process and combined rehabilitation 
techniques with its administration of benefits were more suc 
cessful than others who depended on purely legal ad 
ministrative methods.
Social Security Disability Insurance
The problems of workers' compensation were well known 
to the framers of our national Society Security Disability In 
surance Act. 13 Although it was thought that disability in 
surance would come on stream early in the history of social 
security, as a matter of fact the federal government entered 
the field with the disability freeze in the 1950s and it was not 
until 1960 that we began a full-fledged disability insurance 
program.
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Two of the pitfalls were neatly eliminated in the disability 
insurance program of social security. One was the decision 
not to pay any permanent partial benefits. Either a worker 
was to be considered disabled or not disabled. This decision 
created a host of problems even as it solved others. There 
was no easy way to dispose of doubtful cases. The other 
problem eliminated was the confusion over retirement and 
disability. Workers could collect disability insurance only up 
to the age of 64. At age 65 they would receive social security 
retirement benefits. No one over the age of 65 was eligible to 
receive disability insurance benefits on their own account.
The definition of disability under the Act was the inability 
to engage in substantial gainful activity that is due to a 
physical or mental impairment that is expected to last at least 
12 months. To be considered disabled under this rather strin 
gent definition, a person has to be unable to perform any 
work which he is reasonably qualified to perform, anywhere 
in the economy. It was not a test that depended on the ability 
to perform th duties of one's job, or even one's occupation.
Although all workers age 50 and over were entitled to col 
lect disability insurance payments as early as 1956, it was not 
until 1960 that the program became a general one for all 
covered workers below age 65. Thus we have not yet seen a 
full generation of workers who are covered by the Social 
Security Act disability provisions pass through their working 
lives.
By 1970 we were paying out about $2.7 billion a year in 
disability insurance benefits, an amount that increased to 
$7.6 billion by 1975, a 175 percent increase. The increases in 
the program continued between 1975 and 1976, reaching 
$11.1 billion in 1977. Although payments have not peaked, 
the number of beneficiaries did at about that year, and since 
then, the increases in payments have been modest, ranging 
about 9 to 10 percent each year in payments as wage levels
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have escalated. All told, from 1970 to 1980, there has been a 
436 percent increase in disability insurance payments.
Although the decline in the numbers of beneficiaries began 
to come as early as 1977, the public consciousness of this 
decline did not surface until a good bit later. It was the 1980 
amendments to the Act which tightened the administrative 
regulations as to who should or who should not receive 
benefits. More important, they provided for a review of 
these benefits and it is the administration of this review 
which has created a great deal of public concern over the last 
several years, especially for those persons with mental ill 
nesses.
The problem is a familiar one and it is exactly the same 
problem that we have had in workers' compensation and in 
every disability program. How does one tell whether one is 
disabled; under what conditions does one buy this ticket out 
of the labor force? Bear in mind that the pressure to increase 
retirement ages and to stay in the labor force has been 
matched by this pressure for certain people to get out via the 
disability benefits.
The problem has been that the criteria actually used de 
pend a great deal on the showing of some severe medical im 
pairment. Probably 80 percent of the awards are made to ap 
plicants who have one or more impairments equivalent to 
those listed in the federal regulations. It is only for people 
who do not meet these so-called "medical listings" that con 
sideration is given other factors such as the person's training, 
education and experience.
This possibility excessive reliance on medical conditions 
ignores the fact that there is a large gap between medical con 
dition, on the one hand, and the withdrawal from the labor 
force which is the prerequisite for disability benefits, on the 
other.
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Not Medical Condition Alone
My reasons for emphasizing this difference comes from 
two sources, one sociological and one economic. The 
sociologists, largely influenced by Saad Nagi and others, 14 
have emphasized the differences between medical condition, 
impairment, functional limitation, and the resulting disabili 
ty. They recognize that a medical diagnosis based upon 
symptoms and signs and classified largely according to body 
systems, is useful to the physician interested in cure, but 
possibly irrelevant to the problem of work, in part because 
of the large differences in the extent of severity of any condi 
tion.
The issue is whether or not that medical condition leads to 
an impairment, the enervation of a nerve or the loss of a limb 
to take an extreme case. From there, we need to know 
whether or not that impairment results in any functional 
limitation. We are thinking of such things as ability to lift, to 
carry, to stoop, to bend, to walk, or in the case of mental im 
pairments, the equivalent of functional limitations which 
may be the ability to relate to others or to tolerate the stresses 
of a normal job. I will return to that problem of getting the 
equivalent of functional limitations in mental illnesses in a 
moment.
From an economic point of view, it is essential that we 
have some measure of functional limitations as a health 
variable in an attempt to explain whether or not people with 
disabilities choose or do not choose to participate in the 
labor force. What the framers of the disability insurance law 
and, for that matter, workers' compensation laws never 
recognized explicitly, but always recognized implicitly, is 
that there are disincentive effects to these benefits. These 
disincentive effects are related to the generosity and the 
leniency of the disability transfers generally. The matter is 
well put by Barbara L. Wolfe:
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The older disabled person's work/retirement 
choice depends on potential earnings in the labor 
market, the availability and generosity of 
disability-related transfers and other income sup 
port programs and the disability status of the in 
dividual. Disability status reflects limitations of 
physical, mental or emotional sort which reduce the 
worker's ability to perform the required functions 
of jobs which he is on other grounds qualified to 
hold. It is a concept that links impairment with the 
requirements of specific jobs. 15
The work that as been done thus far attempts to measure 
the income and substitution elasticities associated with 
changes in net wage rates on unearned income generated by 
income transfers. Several studies have attempted to look at 
this problem. 16 Wolfe points out the problem with these 
studies, including their choice of the variable to represent 
health is that some of them do not capture severity, duration 
or the relation of functional limitations to past or available 
occupations. There are other problems relating to the 
measurement of availability of disability-related transfers 
and the fact that some of these leave out labor demand 
variables and include only a few labor supply variables.
Some of the problems with the so-called first generation 
studies have been remedied in the second generations of 
these studies. 17 Each of the later studies is a fairly 
sophisticated work-choice model, and each of them has dif 
ficulties in dealing with so-called true health status of the 
employee.
Parsons, as Wolfe points out, uses subsequent mortality as 
his health status measure. But as we have discussed above, 
there is a great deal of controversy about the relationship 
between mortality and morbidity. Wolfe also points out that 
Leonard's disability status indicator consists of 27 specific
130
health problems, diseases, conditions and infirmities. It 
poses a number of difficulties. It gives no indication of 
severity, it gives no indication of degree of functional limita 
tions and it is not linked to job requirements.
Slade's disability measure indicates whether or not the in 
dividual reports that he or she is limited in getting around. 
This simple self-reported status has a number of problems. 
Wolfe notes that since it is measured contemporaneously 
with labor force participation, it may reflect the individual's 
taste for work and, hence, it may be endogenous to the 
model.
The Haveman and Wolfe disability measures are self- 
reported measures and while they convey duration and inten 
sity, they are very general and may be subject to the charge 
that they allow the legitimization of failure. Persons who are 
unsuccessful at work may be motivated to define themselves 
as permanently sick in order to legitimize their self-defined 
failure. All of these measures capture only some limited 
dimensions of the relevant concept of disability.
Functional Limitations Again
What is needed for purposes of econometric surveys, for 
the various transfer payment programs, and I believe for the 
retirement decisions for aged persons, is a better measure of 
functional limitations.
The search for these measures has been going on for some 
time. The American Medical Association, as far back as 
1971, under the guidance of a committee chaired by Dr. 
Henry Kessler, issued the Guides to the Evaluation of Per 
manent Impairment. 18 Here we have a detailed look at essen 
tially physical impairment or functional limitation measures. 
Such measures required a physical examination to deter 
mine, for example, the extent of flexion of the extremities. 
The Guides specify the exact percentage of disability that
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ought to be assigned for particular conditions. This is a 
heroic attempt to deal not only with the extremities but to 
deal with the evaluation of permanent impairment of backs, 
heart disease and a number of other types of condition which 
would not ordinarily be thought of as being scheduled.
We also have to note the attempt by the Social Security 
Administration in its survey to deal with measures of func 
tional limitations by self-reported responses. These obvious 
ly do not go far enough. It should be possible to develop 
these scales so as to give us some clue as to whether or not a 
person is capable of working, insofar as his health is con 
cerned.
We think a promising beginning is made in the so-called 
functional assessment inventories developed by the Universi 
ty of Minnesota. We are currently engaged in a research pro 
ject where we are trying to test these as measures of func 
tional limitation in a vocational rehabilitation program. 19
What all this boils down to is that the same issues that 
arise as we deal with disability can crop up as we seek to 
measure ability. If one wishes to eliminate compulsory retire 
ment age, residual functional capacity measures become im 
portant. We have to get down to looking not at a medical 
condition classification or even impairments, but rather 
whether or not a person is able to carry out the physical and 
mental functions required by the job or by any job. In this 
regard, there is no doubt that the area we know least about 
has to do with mental impairments. That evaluating mental 
impairments and the residual functioning capacity is a 
troublesome problem is nowhere more apparent than in the 
Disability Insurance program. Most of the controversy has 
arisen in this area as more and more persons have been 
denied benefits in this review process which began in 1981.
Over 900,000 beneficiaries were evaluated as to their 
eligibility status and almost 400,000 of these lost benefits as a
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result of these investigations. A disproportionate amount of 
those who lost benefits were persons with mental im 
pairments of one sort or another. Conceptually, we are just 
beginning to understand what the equivalent of physical 
limitation or functional capacity for mental impairment is. It 
is obviously necessary that we consider such things as carry 
ing out and remembering instructions, responding ap 
propriately to supervision and coworkers and reacting to 
customary work pressures in a routine work setting.
Measuring Ability of Older Workers 
and Retirement Issues
Ability or inability to work because of a mental or physical 
impairment is difficult to determine, but however the issue is 
decided, we know that examination of that person's medical 
condition is not enough. It is not the medical condition, but 
the consequences of that condition—how that condition af 
fects an individual human being's mental and physical func 
tioning that counts, and even that is not enough. We must 
look at how the limitations or residual functioning capacity 
interacts with a host of other factors to determine that per 
son's labor market chances.
These complex considerations are the same whether we are 
considering the injured worker fighting to retain his job, 
another worker doing his best to maximize his disabling con 
ditions so as to leave the labor force, the older worker who is 
seeking to retain his position or the employer seeking to 
retire him at age 65.
The dispute that rages over whether improvements in 
longevity will mean an increase in healthier workers fighting 
to stay in the labor force or an increase in impaired older per 
sons who will become dependent on the working population 
probably centers around the wrong issues. Here again, it is 
not simply a question of possible changes in morbidity levels
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of older workers. Their health must be considered together 
with such factors as their education, their training, the con 
dition of the labor market and the levels of social insurance 
benefits. Does that mean that health is not important? No, 
but it is their physical and mental functioning, not their 
medical conditon, that is going to be the important health 
variable to be considered.
Are we serious about wanting to encourage the participation 
of older workers in the labor force? Are we serious about 
eliminating compulsory retirement age? If we are, it calls for 
action on all fronts, not merely passing legislation which im 
poses costs without assurances of corresponding benefits. 
We will have to think not only about education and training 
programs but retraining programs as workers progress 
through their life cycles. If we are going to live in a rapidly 
changing high technology economy, and if we want to have 
workers equipped to deal with its problems, it is obvious that 
one injection of education which concludes at age 22 or 23 is 
not sufficient to carry workers over the next four, let along 
five or six decades of life.
It is just as obvious that our retirement policy is affected 
by levels of social insurance benefits and particularly by how 
we penalize workers who retire early or reward them for 
staying past the normal retirement age. The 1983 amend 
ments to the Social Security Act will increase normal retire 
ment age to 67 by 1990 and increase the benefits for workers 
staying past their normal retirement age.
Bear in mind that the argument for abolition of com 
pulsory retirement centers around the notion that 
chronological age is irrelevant. That sword cuts both ways. 
Some older people are competent past the age of retirement 
and some younger people are incompetent prior to the age of 
retirement. Eliminating the compulsory retirement age 
means that we have to get serious about tests of performance
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for younger workers, and to the extent that health is impor 
tant, as I think it is, we have to get serious about devising 
measures of physical and mental limitations which can be ap 
plied in sufficiently standardized fashion so as to move the 
discussion away from medical diagnosis to tests of function.
Our experience with disability programs should give us 
pause, but at least the right questions can be asked. If we 
have no compulsory ending point to the work experience and 
we substitute tests of performance, these may well be applied 
to workers long before they reach what used to be the ar 
bitrary age of retirement.
Is has always been an eligible defense against a charge of 
poor performance for a worker to note that, whatever his 
level of performance, it has not changed. If it has been con 
doned for years by the employer, arbitrators have been un 
willing to view low levels of performance as a cause for ter 
mination. That kind of argument is spreading as dismissal 
cases move into law courts in nonunion situations as the doc 
trine of "employment at will" seems to be deteriorating. In 
short, if one seeks to terminate an employee, it is necessary 
to show that something has changed. For this and other 
reasons, we need particularly sensitive measures of physical 
and mental functioning, if not general performance ap 
praisals.
Possibly this may be placing too great a burden on ar 
bitrary tests and on our systems of dispute settlement, be 
they arbitration or the courts. It might be that we could 
make use of the doctrine of presumptions. We could set an 
age of retirement, be it 65, 67 or 68, and if an employer seeks 
to retire someone prior to that age, we could require him to 
show that the workers is no longer able to meet the legitimate 
requirements of the job. Or that his physical or mental func 
tioning, if we deal with it at that level, has deteriorated to the 
point where he is not able to carry on. The presumption
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would be used in the opposite way for situations past that 
age where the employee would have to carry the burden of 
proof. In short, if the employer sought to retire a person past 
that age, the presumption would be that that would be O.K. 
but that the employee would now have the burden of show 
ing that he or she was competent to perform the re 
quirements of the job and that he or she has the requisite 
physical and mental capacities to perform the necessary 
tasks.
The use of presumptions might minimize litigation but one 
cannot be too sanguine about its possibilities. It is sad but 
true that, since the ancient days of Babylonia, we have found 
no satisfactory way to determine the disability status of an 
individual. There simply is no reason to believe that we could 
do much better if we seek to determine, in some legal sense, 
the "ability" status of an older person who the employer 
seeks to retire.
We should recognize that there are limits on what govern 
ments can accomplish in this field. It is one thing to say that 
compulsory retirement at a predetermined age is a bad 
policy; it is another to say that governments should attempt 
to forbid an employer from retiring a person at that age.
The arguments against governmental interference in this 
area go beyond the usual ones which relate the advantages of 
private decisionmaking. We simply lack the technical 
knowledge to derive administered tests of ability applicable 
to the wide range of occupations and industries in the U.S. 
Without such substitute tests, eliminating the chronological 
age test promises to usher in extensive litigation and to im 
pose other costs on private employers to the detriment of our 
competitive situations. If this is too extreme a position and if 
notions of discrimination on the basis of age, any age, are 
firmly entrenched, then laws prohibiting compulsory retire-
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ment are not enough. An integrated national policy requires 
us to move on several fronts: to reexamine our programs of 
education and training and our prevailing pay practices, to 
recognize the incentives and disincentives posed by the social 
insurance programs, and possibly simply to brace ourselves 
for yet another wave of litigation as arbitrators and courts 
consider essentially the same kinds of issues they have been 
struggling with in the disability area.
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